This adds support for a new http.sslAutoClientCert config value.
In cURL 7.77 or later the schannel backend does not automatically send
client certificates from the Windows Certificate Store anymore.
This config value is only used if http.sslBackend is set to "schannel",
and can be used to opt in to the old behavior and force cURL to send
client certificates.
This fixes https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/3292
Signed-off-by: Pascal Muller <pascalmuller@gmail.com>
The native Windows HTTPS backend is based on Secure Channel which lets
the caller decide how to handle revocation checking problems caused by
missing information in the certificate or offline CRL distribution
points.
Unfortunately, cURL chose to handle these problems differently than
OpenSSL by default: while OpenSSL happily ignores those problems
(essentially saying "¯\_(ツ)_/¯"), the Secure Channel backend will error
out instead.
As a remedy, the "no revoke" mode was introduced, which turns off
revocation checking altogether. This is a bit heavy-handed. We support
this via the `http.schannelCheckRevoke` setting.
In https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/4981, we contributed an opt-in
"best effort" strategy that emulates what OpenSSL seems to do.
In Git for Windows, we actually want this to be the default. This patch
makes it so, introducing it as a new value for the
`http.schannelCheckRevoke" setting, which now becmes a tristate: it
accepts the values "false", "true" or "best-effort" (defaulting to the
last one).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch extends the protections introduced for Git GUI's
CVE-2022-41953 to cover `gitk`, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch fixes a vulnerability in Git GUI's "clone" feature
(tracked as CVE-2022-41953) that was graded with a CVSS Score 8.6/10
(high).
These patches were backported to Git GUI in
https://github.com/prati0100/git-gui/pull/85
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Just like CVE-2022-41953 for Git GUI, there exists a vulnerability of
`gitk` where it looks for `taskkill.exe` in the current directory before
searching `PATH`.
Note that the many `exec git` calls are unaffected, due to an obscure
quirk in Tcl's `exec` function. Typically, `git.exe` lives next to
`wish.exe` (i.e. the program that is run to execute `gitk` or Git GUI)
in Git for Windows, and that is the saving grace for `git.exe because
`exec` searches the directory where `wish.exe` lives even before the
current directory, according to
https://www.tcl-lang.org/man/tcl/TclCmd/exec.htm#M24:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The same is not true, however, for `taskkill.exe`: it lives in the
Windows system directory (never mind the 32-bit, Tcl's documentation is
outdated on that point, it really means `C:\Windows\system32`).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
As per https://www.tcl.tk/man/tcl8.6/TclCmd/exec.html#M23, Tcl's `exec`
function goes out of its way to imitate the highly dangerous path lookup
of `cmd.exe`, but _of course_ only on Windows:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The dangerous part is the second item, of course: `exec` _prefers_
executables in the current directory to those that are actually in the
`PATH`.
It is almost as if people wanted to Windows users vulnerable,
specifically.
To avoid that, Git GUI already has the `_which` function that does not
imitate that dangerous practice when looking up executables in the
search path.
However, Git GUI currently fails to use that function e.g. when trying to
execute `aspell` for spell checking.
That is not only dangerous but combined with Tcl's unfortunate default
behavior and with the fact that Git GUI tries to spell-check a
repository just after cloning, leads to a critical Remote Code Execution
vulnerability.
Let's override both `exec` and `open` to always use `_which` instead of
letting Tcl perform the path lookup, to prevent this attack vector.
This addresses CVE-2022-41953.
For more details, see
https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-v4px-mx59-w99c
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We are about to make use of the `_which` function to address
CVE-2022-41953 by overriding Tcl/Tk's unsafe PATH lookup on Windows.
In preparation for that, let's move it close to the top of the file to
make sure that even early `exec` calls that happen during the start-up
of Git GUI benefit from the fix.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We need these in `_which` and they should be defined before that
function's definition.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The `is_Cygwin` function is used, among other things, to determine
how executables are discovered in the `PATH` list by the `_which` function.
We are about to change the behavior of the `_which` function on Windows
(but not Cygwin): On Windows, we want it to ignore empty elements of the
`PATH` instead of treating them as referring to the current directory
(which is a "legacy feature" according to
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03,
but apparently not explicitly deprecated, the POSIX documentation is
quite unclear on that even if the Cygwin project itself considers it to
be deprecated: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/fc74dbf22f5c).
This is important because on Windows, `exec` does something very unsafe
by default (unless we're running a Cygwin version of Tcl, which follows
Unix semantics).
However, we try to `exec` something _inside_ `is_Cygwin` to determine
whether we're running within Cygwin or not, i.e. before we determined
whether we need to handle `PATH` specially or not. That's a Catch-22.
Therefore, and because it is much cleaner anyway, use the
`$::tcl_platform(os)` value which is guaranteed to start with `CYGWIN_`
when running a Cygwin variant of Tcl/Tk, instead of executing `cygpath
--windir`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When looking up an executable via the `_which` function, Git GUI
imitates the `execlp()` strategy where the environment variable `PATH`
is interpreted as a list of paths in which to search.
For historical reasons, stemming from the olden times when it was
uncommon to download a lot of files from the internet into the current
directory, empty elements in this list are treated as if the current
directory had been specified.
Nowadays, of course, this treatment is highly dangerous as the current
directory often contains files that have just been downloaded and not
yet been inspected by the user. Unix/Linux users are essentially
expected to be very, very careful to simply not add empty `PATH`
elements, i.e. not to make use of that feature.
On Windows, however, it is quite common for `PATH` to contain empty
elements by mistake, e.g. as an unintended left-over entry when an
application was installed from the Windows Store and then uninstalled
manually.
While it would probably make most sense to safe-guard not only Windows
users, it seems to be common practice to ignore these empty `PATH`
elements _only_ on Windows, but not on other platforms.
Sadly, this practice is followed inconsistently between different
software projects, where projects with few, if any, Windows-based
contributors tend to be less consistent or even "blissful" about it.
Here is a non-exhaustive list:
Cygwin:
It specifically "eats" empty paths when converting path lists to
POSIX: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/753702223c7d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
PowerShell:
It specifically ignores empty paths when searching the `PATH`.
The reason for this is apparently so self-evident that it is not
even mentioned here:
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_environment_variables#path-information
I.e. it follows the common practice.
CMD:
Oh my, CMD. Let's just forget about it, nobody in their right
(security) mind takes CMD as inspiration. It is so unsafe by
default that we even planned on dropping `Git CMD` from Git for
Windows altogether, and only walked back on that plan when we
found a super ugly hack, just to keep Git's users secure by
default:
https://github.com/git-for-windows/MINGW-packages/commit/82172388bb51
So CMD chooses to hide behind the battle cry "Works as
Designed!" that all too often leaves users vulnerable. CMD is
probably the most prominent project whose lead you want to avoid
following in matters of security.
Win32 API (`CreateProcess()`)
Just like CMD, `CreateProcess()` adheres to the original design
of the path lookup in the name of backward compatibility (see
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessw
for details):
If the file name does not contain a directory path, the
system searches for the executable file in the following
sequence:
1. The directory from which the application loaded.
2. The current directory for the parent process.
[...]
I.e. the Win32 API itself chooses backwards compatibility over
users' safety.
Git LFS:
There have been not one, not two, but three security advisories
about Git LFS executing executables from the current directory by
mistake. As part of one of them, a change was introduced to stop
treating empty `PATH` elements as equivalent to `.`:
https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/7cd7bb0a1f0d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
Go:
Go does not follow the common practice, and you can think about
that what you want:
https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/os/exec/lp_windows.go#L114-L135https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/path/filepath/path_windows.go#L108-L137
Git Credential Manager:
It tries to imitate Git LFS, but unfortunately misses the empty
`PATH` element handling. As of time of writing, this is in the
process of being fixed:
https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager/pull/968
So now that we have established that it is a common practice to ignore
empty `PATH` elements on Windows, let's assess this commit's change
using Schneier's Five-Step Process
(https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2002/0415.html#1):
Step 1: What problem does it solve?
It prevents an entire class of Remote Code Execution exploits via
Git GUI's `Clone` functionality.
Step 2: How well does it solve that problem?
Very well. It prevents the attack vector of luring an unsuspecting
victim into cloning an executable into the worktree root directory
that Git GUI immediately executes.
Step 3: What other security problems does it cause?
Maybe non-security problems: If a project (ab-)uses the unsafe
`PATH` lookup. That would not only be unsafe, though, but
fragile in the first place because it would break when running
in a subdirectory. Therefore I would consider this a scenario
not worth keeping working.
Step 4: What are the costs of this measure?
Almost nil, except for the time writing up this commit message
;-)
Step 5: Given the answers to steps two through four, is the security
measure worth the costs?
Yes. Keeping Git's users Secure By Default is worth it. It's a
tiny price to pay compared to the damages even a single
successful exploit can cost.
So let's follow that common practice in Git GUI, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We started unconditionally testing with CGIPassAuth directive but
it is unavailable in older Apache that ships with CentOS 7 that has
about a year of shelf-life still left. The test has conditionally
been disabled when running with an ancient Apache. This was a fix
for a recent regression caught before the release, so no need to
mention it in the release notes.
* jk/http-test-cgipassauth-unavailable-in-older-apache:
t/lib-httpd: make CGIPassAuth support conditional
The server side of "git clone" now advertises the necessary hints
to clients to help them to clone from an empty repository and learn
object hash algorithm and the (unborn) branch pointed at by HEAD,
even over the older v0/v1 protocol.
* bc/clone-empty-repo-via-protocol-v0:
upload-pack: advertise capabilities when cloning empty repos
When "git send-email" that uses the validate hook is fed a message
without and then with Message-ID, it failed to auto-assign a unique
Message-ID to the former and instead reused the Message-ID from the
latter, which has been corrected. This was a fix for a recent
regression caught before the release, so no need to mention it in
the release notes.
* jc/send-email-pre-process-fix:
t9001: mark the script as no longer leak checker clean
send-email: clear the $message_id after validation
Fix the build problem with NO_PTHREADS defined, a fallout from
recent header file shuffling.
* tb/run-command-needs-alloc-h:
run-command.c: fix missing include under `NO_PTHREADS`
Commit 988aad99b4 (t5563: add tests for basic and anoymous HTTP access,
2023-02-27) added tests that require Apache to support the CGIPassAuth
directive, which was added in Apache 2.4.13. This is fairly old (~8
years), but recent enough that we still encounter it in the wild (e.g.,
RHEL/CentOS 7, which is not EOL until June 2024).
We can live with skipping the new tests on such a platform. But
unfortunately, since the directive is used unconditionally in our
apache.conf, it means the web server fails to start entirely, and we
cannot run other HTTP tests at all (e.g., the basic ones in t5551).
We can fix that by making the config conditional, and only triggering it
for t5563. That solves the problem for t5551 (which then ignores the
directive entirely). For t5563, we'd see apache complain in start_httpd;
with the default setting of GIT_TEST_HTTPD, we'd then skip the whole
script.
But that leaves one small problem: people may set GIT_TEST_HTTPD=1
explicitly, which instructs the tests to fail (rather than skip) when we
can't start the webserver (to avoid accidentally missing some tests).
This could be worked around by having the user manually set
GIT_SKIP_TESTS on a platform with an older Apache. But we can be a bit
friendlier by doing the version check ourselves and setting an
appropriate prereq. We'll use the (lack of) prereq to then skip the rest
of t5563. In theory we could use the prereq to skip individual tests, but
in practice this whole script depends on it.
Reported-by: Todd Zullinger <tmz@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The test uses "format-patch --thread" which is known to leak the
generated message ID list.
Plugging these leaks involves straightening out the memory ownership
rules around rev_info.message_id and rev_info.ref_message_ids, and
is beyond the scope of send-email fix, so for now mark the test as
leaky to unblock the topic before the release.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Recently git-send-email started parsing the same message twice, once
to validate _all_ the message before sending even the first one, and
then after the validation hook is happy and each message gets sent,
to read the contents to find out where to send to etc.
Unfortunately, the effect of reading the messages for validation
lingered even after the validation is done. Namely $message_id gets
assigned if exists in the input files but the variable is global,
and it is not cleared before pre_process_file runs. This causes
reading a message without a message-id followed by reading a message
with a message-id to misbehave---the sub reports as if the message
had the same id as the previously written one.
Clear the variable before starting to read the headers in
pre_process_file.
Tested-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When cloning an empty repository, protocol versions 0 and 1 currently
offer nothing but the header and flush packets for the /info/refs
endpoint. This means that no capabilities are provided, so the client
side doesn't know what capabilities are present.
However, this does pose a problem when working with SHA-256
repositories, since we use the capabilities to know the remote side's
object format (hash algorithm). As of 8b214c2e9d ("clone: propagate
object-format when cloning from void", 2023-04-05), this has been fixed
for protocol v2, since there we always read the hash algorithm from the
remote.
Fortunately, the push version of the protocol already indicates a clue
for how to solve this. When the /info/refs endpoint is accessed for a
push and the remote is empty, we include a dummy "capabilities^{}" ref
pointing to the all-zeros object ID. The protocol documentation already
indicates this should _always_ be sent, even for fetches and clones, so
let's just do that, which means we'll properly announce the hash
algorithm as part of the capabilities. This just works with the
existing code because we share the same ref code for fetches and clones,
and libgit2, JGit, and dulwich do as well.
There is one minor issue to fix, though. If we called send_ref with
namespaces, we would return NULL with the capabilities entry, which
would cause a crash. Instead, let's refactor out a function to print
just the ref itself without stripping the namespace and use it for our
special capabilities entry.
Add several sets of tests for HTTP as well as for local clones. The
behavior can be slightly different for HTTP versus a local or SSH clone
because of the stateless-rpc functionality, so it's worth testing both.
Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <bk2204@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git --attr-source=<tree> cmd $args" is a new way to have any
command to read attributes not from the working tree but from the
given tree object.
* jc/attr-source-tree:
attr: teach "--attr-source=<tree>" global option to "git"
We make liberal use of the strbuf API functions and types, but the
inclusion of <strbuf.h> comes indirectly by including <http.h>,
which does not happen if you build with NO_CURL.
Signed-off-by: Christian Hesse <mail@eworm.de>
Helped-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Originally introduced as `core.useBuiltinFSMonitor` in Git for Windows
and developed, improved and stabilized there, the built-in FSMonitor
only made it into upstream Git (after unnecessarily long hemming and
hawing and throwing overly perfectionist style review sticks into the
spokes) as `core.fsmonitor = true`.
In Git for Windows, with this topic branch, we re-introduce the
now-obsolete config setting, with warnings suggesting to existing users
how to switch to the new config setting, with the intention to
ultimately drop the patch at some stage.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch re-adds the deprecated --stdin/-z options to `git
reset`. Those patches were overridden by a different set of options in
the upstream Git project before we could propose `--stdin`.
We offered this in MinGit to applications that wanted a safer way to
pass lots of pathspecs to Git, and these applications will need to be
adjusted.
Instead of `--stdin`, `--pathspec-from-file=-` should be used, and
instead of `-z`, `--pathspec-file-nul`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
A fix for calling `vim` in Windows Terminal caused a regression and was
reverted. We partially un-revert this, to get the fix again.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This is the recommended way on GitHub to describe policies revolving around
security issues and about supported versions.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Git documentation refers to $HOME and $XDG_CONFIG_HOME often, but does not specify how or where these values come from on Windows where neither is set by default. The new documentation reflects the behavior of setup_windows_environment() in compat/mingw.c.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Barreto <alejandro.barreto@ni.com>
Git for Windows accepts pull requests; Core Git does not. Therefore we
need to adjust the template (because it only matches core Git's
project management style, not ours).
Also: direct Git for Windows enhancements to their contributions page,
space out the text for easy reading, and clarify that the mailing list
is plain text, not HTML.
Signed-off-by: Philip Oakley <philipoakley@iee.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
These are Git for Windows' Git GUI and gitk patches. We will have to
decide at some point what to do about them, but that's a little lower
priority (as Git GUI seems to be unmaintained for the time being, and
the gitk maintainer keeps a very low profile on the Git mailing list,
too).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Getting started contributing to Git can be difficult on a Windows
machine. CONTRIBUTING.md contains a guide to getting started, including
detailed steps for setting up build tools, running tests, and
submitting patches to upstream.
[includes an example by Pratik Karki how to submit v2, v3, v4, etc.]
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The Git project followed suite and added their Code of Conduct, based on
the Contributors' Covenant v1.4.
We edit it slightly to reflect Git for Windows' particulars.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The Git for Windows project has grown quite complex over the years,
certainly much more complex than during the first years where the
`msysgit.git` repository was abusing Git for package management purposes
and the `git/git` fork was called `4msysgit.git`.
Let's describe the status quo in a thorough way.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Rather than using private IFTTT Applets that send mails to this
maintainer whenever a new version of a Git for Windows component was
released, let's use the power of GitHub workflows to make this process
publicly visible.
This workflow monitors the Atom/RSS feeds, and opens a ticket whenever a
new version was released.
Note: Bash sometimes releases multiple patched versions within a few
minutes of each other (i.e. 5.1p1 through 5.1p4, 5.0p15 and 5.0p16). The
MSYS2 runtime also has a similar system. We can address those patches as
a group, so we shouldn't get multiple issues about them.
Note further: We're not acting on newlib releases, OpenSSL alphas, Perl
release candidates or non-stable Perl releases. There's no need to open
issues about them.
Co-authored-by: Matthias Aßhauer <mha1993@live.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Reintroduce the 'core.useBuiltinFSMonitor' config setting (originally added
in 0a756b2a25 (fsmonitor: config settings are repository-specific,
2021-03-05)) after its removal from the upstream version of FSMonitor.
Upstream, the 'core.useBuiltinFSMonitor' setting was rendered obsolete by
"overloading" the 'core.fsmonitor' setting to take a boolean value. However,
several applications (e.g., 'scalar') utilize the original config setting,
so it should be preserved for a deprecation period before complete removal:
* if 'core.fsmonitor' is a boolean, the user is correctly using the new
config syntax; do not use 'core.useBuiltinFSMonitor'.
* if 'core.fsmonitor' is unspecified, use 'core.useBuiltinFSMonitor'.
* if 'core.fsmonitor' is a path, override and use the builtin FSMonitor if
'core.useBuiltinFSMonitor' is 'true'; otherwise, use the FSMonitor hook
indicated by the path.
Additionally, for this deprecation period, advise users to switch to using
'core.fsmonitor' to specify their use of the builtin FSMonitor.
Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com>
