This commit imports mimalloc's source code as per v2.0.9, fetched from
the tag at https://github.com/microsoft/mimalloc.
The .c files are from the src/ subdirectory, and the .h files from the
include/ subdirectory. We will subsequently modify the source code to
accommodate building within Git's context.
Since we plan on using the `mi_*()` family of functions, we skip the
C++-specific source code, some POSIX compliant functions to interact
with mimalloc, and the code that wants to support auto-magic overriding
of the `malloc()` function (mimalloc-new-delete.h, alloc-posix.c,
mimalloc-override.h, alloc-override.c, alloc-override-osx.c,
alloc-override-win.c and static.c).
To appease the `check-whitespace` job of Git's Continuous Integration,
this commit was washed one time via `git rebase --whitespace=fix`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We are about to vendor in `mimalloc`'s source code which we will want to
include `git-compat-util.h` after defining that constant.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The mingw-w64 GCC seems to link implicitly to libwinpthread, which does
implement a pthread emulation (that is more complete than Git's). Let's
keep preferring Git's.
To avoid linker errors where it thinks that the `pthread_self` and the
`pthread_create` symbols are defined twice, let's give our version a
`win32_` prefix, just like we already do for `pthread_join()`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
While Git for Windows does not _ship_ Python (in order to save on
bandwidth), MSYS2 provides very fine Python interpreters that users can
easily take advantage of, by using Git for Windows within its SDK.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch extends the protections introduced for Git GUI's
CVE-2022-41953 to cover `gitk`, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Just like CVE-2022-41953 for Git GUI, there exists a vulnerability of
`gitk` where it looks for `taskkill.exe` in the current directory before
searching `PATH`.
Note that the many `exec git` calls are unaffected, due to an obscure
quirk in Tcl's `exec` function. Typically, `git.exe` lives next to
`wish.exe` (i.e. the program that is run to execute `gitk` or Git GUI)
in Git for Windows, and that is the saving grace for `git.exe because
`exec` searches the directory where `wish.exe` lives even before the
current directory, according to
https://www.tcl-lang.org/man/tcl/TclCmd/exec.htm#M24:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The same is not true, however, for `taskkill.exe`: it lives in the
Windows system directory (never mind the 32-bit, Tcl's documentation is
outdated on that point, it really means `C:\Windows\system32`).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch fixes a vulnerability in Git GUI's "clone" feature
(tracked as CVE-2022-41953) that was graded with a CVSS Score 8.6/10
(high).
These patches were backported to Git GUI in
https://github.com/prati0100/git-gui/pull/85
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
As per https://www.tcl.tk/man/tcl8.6/TclCmd/exec.html#M23, Tcl's `exec`
function goes out of its way to imitate the highly dangerous path lookup
of `cmd.exe`, but _of course_ only on Windows:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The dangerous part is the second item, of course: `exec` _prefers_
executables in the current directory to those that are actually in the
`PATH`.
It is almost as if people wanted to Windows users vulnerable,
specifically.
To avoid that, Git GUI already has the `_which` function that does not
imitate that dangerous practice when looking up executables in the
search path.
However, Git GUI currently fails to use that function e.g. when trying to
execute `aspell` for spell checking.
That is not only dangerous but combined with Tcl's unfortunate default
behavior and with the fact that Git GUI tries to spell-check a
repository just after cloning, leads to a critical Remote Code Execution
vulnerability.
Let's override both `exec` and `open` to always use `_which` instead of
letting Tcl perform the path lookup, to prevent this attack vector.
This addresses CVE-2022-41953.
For more details, see
https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-v4px-mx59-w99c
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We are about to make use of the `_which` function to address
CVE-2022-41953 by overriding Tcl/Tk's unsafe PATH lookup on Windows.
In preparation for that, let's move it close to the top of the file to
make sure that even early `exec` calls that happen during the start-up
of Git GUI benefit from the fix.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We need these in `_which` and they should be defined before that
function's definition.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The `is_Cygwin` function is used, among other things, to determine
how executables are discovered in the `PATH` list by the `_which` function.
We are about to change the behavior of the `_which` function on Windows
(but not Cygwin): On Windows, we want it to ignore empty elements of the
`PATH` instead of treating them as referring to the current directory
(which is a "legacy feature" according to
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03,
but apparently not explicitly deprecated, the POSIX documentation is
quite unclear on that even if the Cygwin project itself considers it to
be deprecated: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/fc74dbf22f5c).
This is important because on Windows, `exec` does something very unsafe
by default (unless we're running a Cygwin version of Tcl, which follows
Unix semantics).
However, we try to `exec` something _inside_ `is_Cygwin` to determine
whether we're running within Cygwin or not, i.e. before we determined
whether we need to handle `PATH` specially or not. That's a Catch-22.
Therefore, and because it is much cleaner anyway, use the
`$::tcl_platform(os)` value which is guaranteed to start with `CYGWIN_`
when running a Cygwin variant of Tcl/Tk, instead of executing `cygpath
--windir`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When looking up an executable via the `_which` function, Git GUI
imitates the `execlp()` strategy where the environment variable `PATH`
is interpreted as a list of paths in which to search.
For historical reasons, stemming from the olden times when it was
uncommon to download a lot of files from the internet into the current
directory, empty elements in this list are treated as if the current
directory had been specified.
Nowadays, of course, this treatment is highly dangerous as the current
directory often contains files that have just been downloaded and not
yet been inspected by the user. Unix/Linux users are essentially
expected to be very, very careful to simply not add empty `PATH`
elements, i.e. not to make use of that feature.
On Windows, however, it is quite common for `PATH` to contain empty
elements by mistake, e.g. as an unintended left-over entry when an
application was installed from the Windows Store and then uninstalled
manually.
While it would probably make most sense to safe-guard not only Windows
users, it seems to be common practice to ignore these empty `PATH`
elements _only_ on Windows, but not on other platforms.
Sadly, this practice is followed inconsistently between different
software projects, where projects with few, if any, Windows-based
contributors tend to be less consistent or even "blissful" about it.
Here is a non-exhaustive list:
Cygwin:
It specifically "eats" empty paths when converting path lists to
POSIX: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/753702223c7d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
PowerShell:
It specifically ignores empty paths when searching the `PATH`.
The reason for this is apparently so self-evident that it is not
even mentioned here:
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_environment_variables#path-information
I.e. it follows the common practice.
CMD:
Oh my, CMD. Let's just forget about it, nobody in their right
(security) mind takes CMD as inspiration. It is so unsafe by
default that we even planned on dropping `Git CMD` from Git for
Windows altogether, and only walked back on that plan when we
found a super ugly hack, just to keep Git's users secure by
default:
https://github.com/git-for-windows/MINGW-packages/commit/82172388bb51
So CMD chooses to hide behind the battle cry "Works as
Designed!" that all too often leaves users vulnerable. CMD is
probably the most prominent project whose lead you want to avoid
following in matters of security.
Win32 API (`CreateProcess()`)
Just like CMD, `CreateProcess()` adheres to the original design
of the path lookup in the name of backward compatibility (see
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessw
for details):
If the file name does not contain a directory path, the
system searches for the executable file in the following
sequence:
1. The directory from which the application loaded.
2. The current directory for the parent process.
[...]
I.e. the Win32 API itself chooses backwards compatibility over
users' safety.
Git LFS:
There have been not one, not two, but three security advisories
about Git LFS executing executables from the current directory by
mistake. As part of one of them, a change was introduced to stop
treating empty `PATH` elements as equivalent to `.`:
https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/7cd7bb0a1f0d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
Go:
Go does not follow the common practice, and you can think about
that what you want:
https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/os/exec/lp_windows.go#L114-L135https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/path/filepath/path_windows.go#L108-L137
Git Credential Manager:
It tries to imitate Git LFS, but unfortunately misses the empty
`PATH` element handling. As of time of writing, this is in the
process of being fixed:
https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager/pull/968
So now that we have established that it is a common practice to ignore
empty `PATH` elements on Windows, let's assess this commit's change
using Schneier's Five-Step Process
(https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2002/0415.html#1):
Step 1: What problem does it solve?
It prevents an entire class of Remote Code Execution exploits via
Git GUI's `Clone` functionality.
Step 2: How well does it solve that problem?
Very well. It prevents the attack vector of luring an unsuspecting
victim into cloning an executable into the worktree root directory
that Git GUI immediately executes.
Step 3: What other security problems does it cause?
Maybe non-security problems: If a project (ab-)uses the unsafe
`PATH` lookup. That would not only be unsafe, though, but
fragile in the first place because it would break when running
in a subdirectory. Therefore I would consider this a scenario
not worth keeping working.
Step 4: What are the costs of this measure?
Almost nil, except for the time writing up this commit message
;-)
Step 5: Given the answers to steps two through four, is the security
measure worth the costs?
Yes. Keeping Git's users Secure By Default is worth it. It's a
tiny price to pay compared to the damages even a single
successful exploit can cost.
So let's follow that common practice in Git GUI, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This commit starts the rebase of 6453d2aba3 to 8810a79228a
While at it, also merge v2.39.2.windows.1.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
A test helper had a single write(2) of 256kB, which was too big for
some platforms (e.g. NonStop), which has been corrected by using
xwrite() wrapper appropriately.
* jc/genzeros-avoid-raw-write:
test-genzeros: avoid raw write(2)
Error messages given upon a signature verification failure used to
discard the errors from underlying gpg program, which has been
corrected.
* js/gpg-errors:
gpg: do show gpg's error message upon failure
t7510: add a test case that does not need gpg
Extend the run-hooks API to allow feeding data from the standard
input when running the hook script(s).
* ab/hook-api-with-stdin:
hook: support a --to-stdin=<path> option
sequencer: use the new hook API for the simpler "post-rewrite" call
hook API: support passing stdin to hooks, convert am's 'post-rewrite'
run-command: allow stdin for run_processes_parallel
run-command.c: remove dead assignment in while-loop
Leak fixes.
* ab/various-leak-fixes:
push: free_refs() the "local_refs" in set_refspecs()
push: refactor refspec_append_mapped() for subsequent leak-fix
receive-pack: release the linked "struct command *" list
grep API: plug memory leaks by freeing "header_list"
grep.c: refactor free_grep_patterns()
builtin/merge.c: free "&buf" on "Your local changes..." error
builtin/merge.c: use fixed strings, not "strbuf", fix leak
show-branch: free() allocated "head" before return
commit-graph: fix a parse_options_concat() leak
http-backend.c: fix cmd_main() memory leak, refactor reg{exec,free}()
http-backend.c: fix "dir" and "cmd_arg" leaks in cmd_main()
worktree: fix a trivial leak in prune_worktrees()
repack: fix leaks on error with "goto cleanup"
name-rev: don't xstrdup() an already dup'd string
various: add missing clear_pathspec(), fix leaks
clone: use free() instead of UNLEAK()
commit-graph: use free_commit_graph() instead of UNLEAK()
bundle.c: don't leak the "args" in the "struct child_process"
tests: mark tests as passing with SANITIZE=leak
The Git for Windows project has grown quite complex over the years,
certainly much more complex than during the first years where the
msysgit.git repository was abusing Git for package management purposes
and the git/git fork was called 4msysgit.git.
Let's describe the status quo in a thorough way.
The Git for Windows project has grown quite complex over the years,
certainly much more complex than during the first years where the
`msysgit.git` repository was abusing Git for package management purposes
and the `git/git` fork was called `4msysgit.git`.
Let's describe the status quo in a thorough way.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This test helper feeds 256kB of data at once to a single invocation
of the write(2) system call, which may be too much for some
platforms.
Call our xwrite() wrapper that knows to honor MAX_IO_SIZE limit and
cope with short writes due to EINTR instead, and die a bit more
loudly by calling die_errno() when xwrite() indicates an error.
Reported-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The documentation mistakenly said that the default format was
similar to RFC 2822 format and tried to specify it by enumerating
differences, which had two problems:
* There are some more differences from the 2822 format that are not
mentioned; worse yet
* The default format is not modeled after RFC 2822 format at all.
As can be seen in f80cd783 (date.c: add "show_date()" function.,
2005-05-06), it is a derivative of ctime(3) format.
Stop saying that it is similar to RFC 2822, and rewrite the
description to explain the format without requiring the reader to
know any other format.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Finally retire the scripted "git add -p/-i" implementation and have
everybody use the one reimplemented in C.
* ab/retire-scripted-add-p:
docs & comments: replace mentions of "git-add--interactive.perl"
add API: remove run_add_interactive() wrapper function
add: remove "add.interactive.useBuiltin" & Perl "git add--interactive"
Userdiff regexp update for Java language.
* ar/userdiff-java-update:
userdiff: support Java sealed classes
userdiff: support Java record types
userdiff: support Java type parameters
In-tree .gitattributes update to match the way we recommend our
users to mark a file as text.
* po/attributes-text:
.gitattributes: include `text` attribute for eol attributes
Plug leaks in sequencer subsystem and its users.
* ab/sequencer-unleak:
commit.c: free() revs.commit in get_fork_point()
builtin/rebase.c: free() "options.strategy_opts"
sequencer.c: always free() the "msgbuf" in do_pick_commit()
builtin/rebase.c: fix "options.onto_name" leak
builtin/revert.c: move free-ing of "revs" to replay_opts_release()
sequencer API users: fix get_replay_opts() leaks
sequencer.c: split up sequencer_remove_state()
rebase: use "cleanup" pattern in do_interactive_rebase()
The bundle-URI subsystem adds support for creation-token heuristics
to help incremental fetches.
* ds/bundle-uri-5:
bundle-uri: test missing bundles with heuristic
bundle-uri: store fetch.bundleCreationToken
fetch: fetch from an external bundle URI
bundle-uri: drop bundle.flag from design doc
clone: set fetch.bundleURI if appropriate
bundle-uri: download in creationToken order
bundle-uri: parse bundle.<id>.creationToken values
bundle-uri: parse bundle.heuristic=creationToken
t5558: add tests for creationToken heuristic
bundle: verify using check_connected()
bundle: test unbundling with incomplete history
In an environment where dynamically generated code is prohibited to
run (e.g. SELinux), failure to JIT pcre patterns is expected. Fall
back to interpreted execution in such a case.
* cb/grep-fallback-failing-jit:
grep: fall back to interpreter if JIT memory allocation fails
There are few things more frustrating when signing a commit fails than
reading a terse "error: gpg failed to sign the data" message followed by
the unsurprising "fatal: failed to write commit object" message.
In many cases where signing a commit or tag fails, `gpg` actually said
something helpful, on its stderr, and Git even consumed that, but then
keeps mum about it.
Teach Git to stop withholding that rather important information.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This test case not only increases test coverage in setups without
working gpg, but also prepares for verifying that the error message of
`gpg.program` is shown upon failure.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
