This topic vendors in mimalloc v2.0.9, a fast allocator that allows Git
for Windows to perform efficiently.
Switch Git for Windows to using mimalloc instead of nedmalloc
In MSYS2, we have two Python interpreters at our disposal, so we can
include the Python stuff in the build.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch teaches `git clean` to respect NTFS junctions and Unix
bind mounts: it will now stop at those boundaries.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch allows us to specify absolute paths without the drive
prefix e.g. when cloning.
Example:
C:\Users\me> git clone https://github.com/git/git \upstream-git
This will clone into a new directory C:\upstream-git, in line with how
Windows interprets absolute paths.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
These fixes were necessary for Sverre Rabbelier's remote-hg to work,
but for some magic reason they are not necessary for the current
remote-hg. Makes you wonder how that one gets away with it.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
As pointed out in https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/1676,
the `git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree` command currently fails when
the current directory's path contains symbolic links.
The underlying reason for this bug is that `getcwd()` is supposed to
resolve symbolic links, but our `mingw_getcwd()` implementation did not.
We do have all the building blocks for that, though: the
`GetFinalPathByHandleW()` function will resolve symbolic links. However,
we only called that function if `GetLongPathNameW()` failed, for
historical reasons: the latter function was supported for a long time,
but the former API function was introduced only with Windows Vista, and
we used to support also Windows XP. With that support having been
dropped, we are free to call the symbolic link-resolving function right
away.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The winsock2 library provides functions that work on different data
types than file descriptors, therefore we wrap them.
But that is not the only difference: they also do not set `errno` but
expect the callers to enquire about errors via `WSAGetLastError()`.
Let's translate that into appropriate `errno` values whenever the socket
operations fail so that Git's code base does not have to change its
expectations.
This closes https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/2404
Helped-by: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhost@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Since commit 0c499ea60f the send-pack builtin uses the side-band-64k
capability if advertised by the server.
Unfortunately this breaks pushing over the dump git protocol if used
over a network connection.
The detailed reasons for this breakage are (by courtesy of Jeff Preshing,
quoted from ttps://groups.google.com/d/msg/msysgit/at8D7J-h7mw/eaLujILGUWoJ):
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
MinGW wraps Windows sockets in CRT file descriptors in order to mimic the
functionality of POSIX sockets. This causes msvcrt.dll to treat sockets as
Installable File System (IFS) handles, calling ReadFile, WriteFile,
DuplicateHandle and CloseHandle on them. This approach works well in simple
cases on recent versions of Windows, but does not support all usage patterns.
In particular, using this approach, any attempt to read & write concurrently
on the same socket (from one or more processes) will deadlock in a scenario
where the read waits for a response from the server which is only invoked after
the write. This is what send_pack currently attempts to do in the use_sideband
codepath.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The new config option "sendpack.sideband" allows to override the side-band-64k
capability of the server, and thus makes the dump git protocol work.
Other transportation methods like ssh and http/https still benefit from
the sideband channel, therefore the default value of "sendpack.sideband"
is still true.
[jes: split out the documentation into Documentation/config/]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Braun <thomas.braun@byte-physics.de>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Schneider <oliver@assarbad.net>
Thorough benchmarking with repacking a subset of linux.git (the commit
history reachable from 93a6fefe2f ([PATCH] fix the SYSCTL=n compilation,
2007-02-28), to be precise) suggest that this allocator is on par, in
multi-threaded situations maybe even better than nedmalloc:
`git repack -adfq` with mimalloc, 8 threads:
31.166991900 27.576763800 28.712311000 27.373859000 27.163141900
`git repack -adfq` with nedmalloc, 8 threads:
31.915032900 27.149883100 28.244933700 27.240188800 28.580849500
In a different test using GitHub Actions build agents (probably
single-threaded, a core-strength of nedmalloc)):
`git repack -q -d -l -A --unpack-unreachable=2.weeks.ago` with mimalloc:
943.426 978.500 939.709 959.811 954.605
`git repack -q -d -l -A --unpack-unreachable=2.weeks.ago` with nedmalloc:
995.383 952.179 943.253 963.043 980.468
While these measurements were not executed with complete scientific
rigor, as no hardware was set aside specifically for these benchmarks,
it shows that mimalloc and nedmalloc perform almost the same, nedmalloc
with a bit higher variance and also slightly higher average (further
testing suggests that nedmalloc performs worse in multi-threaded
situations than in single-threaded ones).
In short: mimalloc seems to be slightly better suited for our purposes
than nedmalloc.
Seeing that mimalloc is developed actively, while nedmalloc ceased to
see any updates in eight years, let's use mimalloc on Windows instead.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Always use the internal "use_weak" random seed when initializing
the "mimalloc" heap when statically linked on Windows.
The imported "mimalloc" routines support several random sources
to seed the heap data structures, including BCrypt.dll and
RtlGenRandom. Crashes have been reported when using BCrypt.dll
if it initialized during an `atexit()` handler function. Granted,
such DLL initialization should not happen in an atexit handler,
but yet the crashes remain.
It should be noted that on Windows when statically linked, the
mimalloc startup code (called by the GCC CRT to initialize static
data prior to calling `main()`) always uses the internal "weak"
random seed. "mimalloc" does not try to load an alternate
random source until after the OS initialization has completed.
Heap data is stored in `__declspec(thread)` TLS data and in theory
each Git thread will have its own heap data. However, testing
shows that the "mimalloc" library doesn't actually call
`os_random_buf()` (to load a new random source) when creating these
new per-thread heap structures.
However, if an atexit handler is forced to run on a non-main
thread, the "mimalloc" library *WILL* try to create a new heap
and seed it with `os_random_buf()`. (The reason for this is still
a mystery to this author.) The `os_random_buf()` call can cause
the (previously uninitialized BCrypt.dll library) to be dynamically
loaded and a call made into it. Crashes have been reported in
v2.40.1.vfs.0.0 while in this call.
As a workaround, the fix here forces the use of the internal
"use_weak" random code for the subsequent `os_random_buf()` calls.
Since we have been using that random generator for the majority
of the program, it seems safe to use it for the final few mallocs
in the atexit handler (of which there really shouldn't be that many.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhostetler@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
By defining `USE_MIMALLOC`, Git can now be compiled with that
nicely-fast and small allocator.
Note that we have to disable a couple `DEVELOPER` options to build
mimalloc's source code, as it makes heavy use of declarations after
statements, among other things that disagree with Git's conventions.
We even have to silence some GCC warnings in non-DEVELOPER mode. For
example, the `-Wno-array-bounds` flag is needed because in `-O2` builds,
trying to call `NtCurrentTeb()` (which `_mi_thread_id()` does on
Windows) causes the bogus warning about a system header, likely related
to https://sourceforge.net/p/mingw-w64/mailman/message/37674519/ and to
https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=99578:
C:/git-sdk-64-minimal/mingw64/include/psdk_inc/intrin-impl.h:838:1:
error: array subscript 0 is outside array bounds of 'long long unsigned int[0]' [-Werror=array-bounds]
838 | __buildreadseg(__readgsqword, unsigned __int64, "gs", "q")
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Also: The `mimalloc` library uses C11-style atomics, therefore we must
require that standard when compiling with GCC if we want to use
`mimalloc` (instead of requiring "only" C99). This is what we do in the
CMake definition already, therefore this commit does not need to touch
`contrib/buildsystems/`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We want to compile mimalloc's source code as part of Git, rather than
requiring the code to be built as an external library: mimalloc uses a
CMake-based build, which is not necessarily easy to integrate into the
flavors of Git for Windows (which will be the main benefitting port).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
While Git for Windows does not _ship_ Python (in order to save on
bandwidth), MSYS2 provides very fine Python interpreters that users can
easily take advantage of, by using Git for Windows within its SDK.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Windows' equivalent to "bind mounts", NTFS junction points, can be
unlinked without affecting the mount target. This is clearly what users
expect to happen when they call `git clean -dfx` in a worktree that
contains NTFS junction points: the junction should be removed, and the
target directory of said junction should be left alone (unless it is
inside the worktree).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This commit imports mimalloc's source code as per v2.0.9, fetched from
the tag at https://github.com/microsoft/mimalloc.
The .c files are from the src/ subdirectory, and the .h files from the
include/ subdirectory. We will subsequently modify the source code to
accommodate building within Git's context.
Since we plan on using the `mi_*()` family of functions, we skip the
C++-specific source code, some POSIX compliant functions to interact
with mimalloc, and the code that wants to support auto-magic overriding
of the `malloc()` function (mimalloc-new-delete.h, alloc-posix.c,
mimalloc-override.h, alloc-override.c, alloc-override-osx.c,
alloc-override-win.c and static.c).
To appease the `check-whitespace` job of Git's Continuous Integration,
this commit was washed one time via `git rebase --whitespace=fix`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We are about to vendor in `mimalloc`'s source code which we will want to
include `git-compat-util.h` after defining that constant.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The mingw-w64 GCC seems to link implicitly to libwinpthread, which does
implement a pthread emulation (that is more complete than Git's). Let's
keep preferring Git's.
To avoid linker errors where it thinks that the `pthread_self` and the
`pthread_create` symbols are defined twice, let's give our version a
`win32_` prefix, just like we already do for `pthread_join()`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When specifying an absolute path without a drive prefix, we convert that
path internally. Let's make sure that we handle that case properly, too
;-)
This fixes the command
git clone https://github.com/git-for-windows/git \G4W
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
After importing anything with fast-import, we should always let the
garbage collector do its job, since the objects are written to disk
inefficiently.
This brings down an initial import of http://selenic.com/hg from about
230 megabytes to about 14.
In the future, we may want to make this configurable on a per-remote
basis, or maybe teach fast-import about it in the first place.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
It seems to be not exactly rare on Windows to install NTFS junction
points (the equivalent of "bind mounts" on Linux/Unix) in worktrees,
e.g. to map some development tools into a subdirectory.
In such a scenario, it is pretty horrible if `git clean -dfx` traverses
into the mapped directory and starts to "clean up".
Let's just not do that. Let's make sure before we traverse into a
directory that it is not a mount point (or junction).
This addresses https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/issues/607
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
On Windows, there are several categories of absolute paths. One such
category starts with a backslash and is implicitly relative to the
drive associated with the current working directory. Example:
c:
git clone https://github.com/git-for-windows/git \G4W
should clone into C:\G4W.
There is currently a problem with that, in that mingw_mktemp() does not
expect the _wmktemp() function to prefix the absolute path with the
drive prefix, and as a consequence, the resulting path does not fit into
the originally-passed string buffer. The symptom is a "Result too large"
error.
Reported by Juan Carlos Arevalo Baeza.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This happens only when the corresponding commits are not exported in
the current fast-export run. This can happen either when the relevant
commit is already marked, or when the commit is explicitly marked
as UNINTERESTING with a negative ref by another argument.
This breaks fast-export basec remote helpers.
Signed-off-by: Sverre Rabbelier <srabbelier@gmail.com>
This topic branch extends the protections introduced for Git GUI's
CVE-2022-41953 to cover `gitk`, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch fixes a vulnerability in Git GUI's "clone" feature
(tracked as CVE-2022-41953) that was graded with a CVSS Score 8.6/10
(high).
These patches were backported to Git GUI in
https://github.com/prati0100/git-gui/pull/85
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Just like CVE-2022-41953 for Git GUI, there exists a vulnerability of
`gitk` where it looks for `taskkill.exe` in the current directory before
searching `PATH`.
Note that the many `exec git` calls are unaffected, due to an obscure
quirk in Tcl's `exec` function. Typically, `git.exe` lives next to
`wish.exe` (i.e. the program that is run to execute `gitk` or Git GUI)
in Git for Windows, and that is the saving grace for `git.exe because
`exec` searches the directory where `wish.exe` lives even before the
current directory, according to
https://www.tcl-lang.org/man/tcl/TclCmd/exec.htm#M24:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The same is not true, however, for `taskkill.exe`: it lives in the
Windows system directory (never mind the 32-bit, Tcl's documentation is
outdated on that point, it really means `C:\Windows\system32`).
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
As per https://www.tcl.tk/man/tcl8.6/TclCmd/exec.html#M23, Tcl's `exec`
function goes out of its way to imitate the highly dangerous path lookup
of `cmd.exe`, but _of course_ only on Windows:
If a directory name was not specified as part of the application
name, the following directories are automatically searched in
order when attempting to locate the application:
The directory from which the Tcl executable was loaded.
The current directory.
The Windows 32-bit system directory.
The Windows home directory.
The directories listed in the path.
The dangerous part is the second item, of course: `exec` _prefers_
executables in the current directory to those that are actually in the
`PATH`.
It is almost as if people wanted to Windows users vulnerable,
specifically.
To avoid that, Git GUI already has the `_which` function that does not
imitate that dangerous practice when looking up executables in the
search path.
However, Git GUI currently fails to use that function e.g. when trying to
execute `aspell` for spell checking.
That is not only dangerous but combined with Tcl's unfortunate default
behavior and with the fact that Git GUI tries to spell-check a
repository just after cloning, leads to a critical Remote Code Execution
vulnerability.
Let's override both `exec` and `open` to always use `_which` instead of
letting Tcl perform the path lookup, to prevent this attack vector.
This addresses CVE-2022-41953.
For more details, see
https://github.com/git-for-windows/git/security/advisories/GHSA-v4px-mx59-w99c
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We are about to make use of the `_which` function to address
CVE-2022-41953 by overriding Tcl/Tk's unsafe PATH lookup on Windows.
In preparation for that, let's move it close to the top of the file to
make sure that even early `exec` calls that happen during the start-up
of Git GUI benefit from the fix.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
We need these in `_which` and they should be defined before that
function's definition.
This commit is best viewed with `--color-moved`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
The `is_Cygwin` function is used, among other things, to determine
how executables are discovered in the `PATH` list by the `_which` function.
We are about to change the behavior of the `_which` function on Windows
(but not Cygwin): On Windows, we want it to ignore empty elements of the
`PATH` instead of treating them as referring to the current directory
(which is a "legacy feature" according to
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03,
but apparently not explicitly deprecated, the POSIX documentation is
quite unclear on that even if the Cygwin project itself considers it to
be deprecated: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/fc74dbf22f5c).
This is important because on Windows, `exec` does something very unsafe
by default (unless we're running a Cygwin version of Tcl, which follows
Unix semantics).
However, we try to `exec` something _inside_ `is_Cygwin` to determine
whether we're running within Cygwin or not, i.e. before we determined
whether we need to handle `PATH` specially or not. That's a Catch-22.
Therefore, and because it is much cleaner anyway, use the
`$::tcl_platform(os)` value which is guaranteed to start with `CYGWIN_`
when running a Cygwin variant of Tcl/Tk, instead of executing `cygpath
--windir`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
When looking up an executable via the `_which` function, Git GUI
imitates the `execlp()` strategy where the environment variable `PATH`
is interpreted as a list of paths in which to search.
For historical reasons, stemming from the olden times when it was
uncommon to download a lot of files from the internet into the current
directory, empty elements in this list are treated as if the current
directory had been specified.
Nowadays, of course, this treatment is highly dangerous as the current
directory often contains files that have just been downloaded and not
yet been inspected by the user. Unix/Linux users are essentially
expected to be very, very careful to simply not add empty `PATH`
elements, i.e. not to make use of that feature.
On Windows, however, it is quite common for `PATH` to contain empty
elements by mistake, e.g. as an unintended left-over entry when an
application was installed from the Windows Store and then uninstalled
manually.
While it would probably make most sense to safe-guard not only Windows
users, it seems to be common practice to ignore these empty `PATH`
elements _only_ on Windows, but not on other platforms.
Sadly, this practice is followed inconsistently between different
software projects, where projects with few, if any, Windows-based
contributors tend to be less consistent or even "blissful" about it.
Here is a non-exhaustive list:
Cygwin:
It specifically "eats" empty paths when converting path lists to
POSIX: https://github.com/cygwin/cygwin/commit/753702223c7d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
PowerShell:
It specifically ignores empty paths when searching the `PATH`.
The reason for this is apparently so self-evident that it is not
even mentioned here:
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/microsoft.powershell.core/about/about_environment_variables#path-information
I.e. it follows the common practice.
CMD:
Oh my, CMD. Let's just forget about it, nobody in their right
(security) mind takes CMD as inspiration. It is so unsafe by
default that we even planned on dropping `Git CMD` from Git for
Windows altogether, and only walked back on that plan when we
found a super ugly hack, just to keep Git's users secure by
default:
https://github.com/git-for-windows/MINGW-packages/commit/82172388bb51
So CMD chooses to hide behind the battle cry "Works as
Designed!" that all too often leaves users vulnerable. CMD is
probably the most prominent project whose lead you want to avoid
following in matters of security.
Win32 API (`CreateProcess()`)
Just like CMD, `CreateProcess()` adheres to the original design
of the path lookup in the name of backward compatibility (see
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createprocessw
for details):
If the file name does not contain a directory path, the
system searches for the executable file in the following
sequence:
1. The directory from which the application loaded.
2. The current directory for the parent process.
[...]
I.e. the Win32 API itself chooses backwards compatibility over
users' safety.
Git LFS:
There have been not one, not two, but three security advisories
about Git LFS executing executables from the current directory by
mistake. As part of one of them, a change was introduced to stop
treating empty `PATH` elements as equivalent to `.`:
https://github.com/git-lfs/git-lfs/commit/7cd7bb0a1f0d
I.e. it follows the common practice.
Go:
Go does not follow the common practice, and you can think about
that what you want:
https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/os/exec/lp_windows.go#L114-L135https://github.com/golang/go/blob/go1.19.3/src/path/filepath/path_windows.go#L108-L137
Git Credential Manager:
It tries to imitate Git LFS, but unfortunately misses the empty
`PATH` element handling. As of time of writing, this is in the
process of being fixed:
https://github.com/GitCredentialManager/git-credential-manager/pull/968
So now that we have established that it is a common practice to ignore
empty `PATH` elements on Windows, let's assess this commit's change
using Schneier's Five-Step Process
(https://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram/archives/2002/0415.html#1):
Step 1: What problem does it solve?
It prevents an entire class of Remote Code Execution exploits via
Git GUI's `Clone` functionality.
Step 2: How well does it solve that problem?
Very well. It prevents the attack vector of luring an unsuspecting
victim into cloning an executable into the worktree root directory
that Git GUI immediately executes.
Step 3: What other security problems does it cause?
Maybe non-security problems: If a project (ab-)uses the unsafe
`PATH` lookup. That would not only be unsafe, though, but
fragile in the first place because it would break when running
in a subdirectory. Therefore I would consider this a scenario
not worth keeping working.
Step 4: What are the costs of this measure?
Almost nil, except for the time writing up this commit message
;-)
Step 5: Given the answers to steps two through four, is the security
measure worth the costs?
Yes. Keeping Git's users Secure By Default is worth it. It's a
tiny price to pay compared to the damages even a single
successful exploit can cost.
So let's follow that common practice in Git GUI, too.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Originally introduced as `core.useBuiltinFSMonitor` in Git for Windows
and developed, improved and stabilized there, the built-in FSMonitor
only made it into upstream Git (after unnecessarily long hemming and
hawing and throwing overly perfectionist style review sticks into the
spokes) as `core.fsmonitor = true`.
In Git for Windows, with this topic branch, we re-introduce the
now-obsolete config setting, with warnings suggesting to existing users
how to switch to the new config setting, with the intention to
ultimately drop the patch at some stage.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
This topic branch re-adds the deprecated --stdin/-z options to `git
reset`. Those patches were overridden by a different set of options in
the upstream Git project before we could propose `--stdin`.
We offered this in MinGit to applications that wanted a safer way to
pass lots of pathspecs to Git, and these applications will need to be
adjusted.
Instead of `--stdin`, `--pathspec-from-file=-` should be used, and
instead of `-z`, `--pathspec-file-nul`.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
A fix for calling `vim` in Windows Terminal caused a regression and was
reverted. We partially un-revert this, to get the fix again.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
